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ABSTrAcT
The study examines the role of outside directors and institutional 
shareholders in constraining the earnings management activities.  
A sample of 613 firms from construction, industrial products and 
consumer products sectors were selected from the main board.  The 
time period covered for this study was from year 2001 to 2003.  
Modified Jones Model with cross sectional approach was employed in 
this study.  The finding shows that magnitude of earnings management 
in Malaysian listed firms has approximately 16% of prior year total 
assets.  Most firms manage the earnings upward rather than downwards.  
No relationship was observed between the degree of earnings 
manipulation and the proportion of outside directors and institutional 
shareholders. However, there is weak evidence to show that outside 
directors have some effect in curbing the earnings management in the 
construction sector. Adding more outside directors in the board and 
having institutional shareholders may not be able to reduce earnings 
management practices if the ownership of a firm is highly concentrated 
and the process of selecting outside directors is not clearly stated and 
transparent.
Keywords: Board structure, institutional ownership, earnings 
management
InTrOducTIOn
Earnings often represent firm performance and it conveys firm values to investors 
(Larry et al., 2004).  However these reported earnings may be managed by managers 
as the Generally Accepted Accounting principles (GAAP) allow alternative 
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accounting methods to be used by firms.  Earnings management is legal if the 
reported earnings are adjusted in line with GAAP such as changing the methods for 
inventory valuation and depreciation.  Earnings management becomes fraudulent 
activities when it falls outside the bound of GAAP like accelerating revenue 
recognition and deferring expenses recognition.  In general, earnings management is 
defined as the alteration of firm’s reported economic performance either to mislead 
shareholders or to influence contractual outcomes (Healey and Wahlen, 1999).  The 
most prominent examples of earnings management fraudulent are WorldCom, Enron 
and Refco cases.  These corporate scandals have created doubt on the true and fair 
accounting practices exercised by firms.  B. Xie et al. (2003) provide evidence that 
outside directors are able to constrain earnings management activities.  R. Chung 
et al. (2002) argue that institutional shareholders have implication on earnings 
management.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the separate and joint effect of board 
structure and institutional ownership structure on earnings management.  The 
paper also looks into the role of outside directors and institutional shareholders 
in construction, industrial products and consumer products sectors with earnings 
management.
EArnIngS MAnAgEMEnT wITh BOArd STrucTurE 
And InSTITuTIOnAl OwnErShIp STrucTurE 
Earnings Management
Discretionary accruals represent the extent of earnings management.  Discretionary 
accruals reflect subjective accounting choices made by managers (R. Chung et 
al., 2002).  The magnitude of discretionary accruals is indicated as a percentage 
of assets of a firm.  The higher the value of discretional accruals, the greater the 
earnings is manipulated.  Earnings management may take the form of either 
income-increasing or income-decreasing accounting choices.  Income-increasing 
manipulation means positive discretionary accruals whereas income-decreasing 
indicate negative discretionary accruals.
Managers would like to manage the earnings to increase their private gain. 
Healey (1985), McNicholas and Wilson (1988), Gaver et al. (1995), Houlthausen 
et al.(1995) and Balsam (1998) provide evidence that management who are 
contractually bound to achieve target earnings have greater tendencies to manage 
earnings.  Furthermore, managers might use earnings management before or after 
the period of initial public offering (Aharony et al., 2003; Teoh et al., 1998). 
The rationale for manipulating earnings is to increase issuing stock price.  Lu 
Jianqiao (1999) shows that loss-making companies conduct remarkable earnings 
management.
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Incentives to engage in earnings management could be mitigated through 
effective corporate governance mechanisms such as board structure, ownership 
structure, advisor structure and capital structure.  Besides internal factors, good 
corporate governance practice is also guided by the requirements of Registrar of 
Companies (ROC), Securities Commission (SC), Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur 
(BSKL), Bank Negara, Foreign Direct Investment Committee (FIC) and Ministry 
of Finance (MOF).  However, having a good set of rules and regulations do not 
guarantee good corporate governance practices unless regulatory authorities 
effectively enforce these requirements.
Board Structure and Earnings Management
Board of directors play an important role in establishing good practices in a company. 
Directors are in charge of monitoring management to protect shareholders’ interest. 
Directors have to ensure the interest of shareholders and managers are aligned.  The 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers will arise if managers used 
earnings management to obtain private gains (Healey, 1985) or to reduce likelihood 
of dismissal when performance is low (Weibach, 1998).
The Board Committee comprises of executive directors (inside directors) and 
non-executive directors (outside directors including independent non-executive). 
The role of independent non-executive directors is to bring independent judgment 
to the Board.  The need for independent non-executive directors is to provide 
a check-and-balance to the activities of executive directors.  Independent non-
executive directors are supposed to monitor management activities on behalf of 
shareholders.  The findings of Dechow et al.(1996) and Beasley (1996) imply that 
higher proportion of outside directors in the Board Committee is associated with 
greater confidence in the firm’s financial reporting system.  Earnings management 
is less likely to occur in companies whose board has more independent directors 
(Biao Xie et al., 2003; Mather.P and Ramsay A, 2006; Beatriz Garsia Osma., 2008;. 
Bikki J. and Tsui J., 2009.
However, Yun W. Park and Hyun Han Shin (2004), Norman M.S. et al. (2005) 
and Kam P.M. (2007) find that outside directors do not reduce the incidence of 
earnings management.  In addition, Rashidah A.R and Fairuzana H.M. (2006) found 
that earnings management is positively related to the size of the board of directors. 
These evidence  indicate that outside directors may lack the financial sophistication 
to detect earnings management or sense of ownership to the firm they monitor. 
Bhagat and Black (2000) and Klein (1998) argue that the relationship between the 
proportion of outside directors and long term financial performance has not been 
supported in empirical research. 
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Ownership Structure and Earnings Management
Ownership structure of a firm can be categorised into two groups: proportion of 
shares owned by insiders and outsiders; proportion of shares owned by institutional 
versus individual shareholders.
For the insider and outsider shareholders category, Dahliwal, Salamon, and 
Smith (1982) found that managerial ownership is negatively associated with 
earnings manipulation.  Managerial ownership is a variable that might reduce the 
agency costs as the motivations of managers are aligned closely to the objectives 
of other shareholders.
Institutional investors are large investors, other than natural person, who 
exercise discretion over investment of others.  Organizations which are considered 
as institutional investors are insurance companies (life and non-life), pension 
funds, investment trusts (including unit trusts), financial institutions (including 
banks, finance companies, building societies and credit cooperatives), investment 
companies, and other nominee companies associated with the above categories 
of institutions (Lang and McNichols,1997).  Institutional investors have the 
opportunity, resources and ability to monitor, discipline and influence a manager’s 
decision in the firm (Monks and Minow, 1995).  McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
support the above statement and report a significant relationship between the value 
of a firm and the percentage of share owned by institutional shareholders.  Richard, 
Michael and Jeong-Bon Kim (2002), Pin Seng Koh. (2005) and Bita Mashayekhi 
(2008) argued that institutional share ownership may have implications for earnings 
management as they are able to influence the company’s management.  The results 
indicate that institutions with large shareholdings play an active role in monitoring 
managerial opportunism in managing the reported earnings.  This is because when 
the institutions invest in the long term period, they are more concerned about the 
underlying profitability of the companies and be wary of the use of discretional 
accruals to manage the earnings. 
METhOdOlOgy
Modified Jones Model is utilized in this paper to estimate the discretionary accruals 
which represent the extent of earnings management.  This model is selected because 
it has been found to be the most powerful, widely used and accepted model in 
detecting the earnings management practice (Dechow et al. 1995; DeFond and 
park, 1997; Teoh et al., 1998).  Sample selection is based on the main board firms 
of Bursa Malaysia from three main sectors: consumer products, industrial products 
and construction.
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Estimation of discretionary Accruals
Total accruals can be decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. 
Discretionary accruals reflect subjective accounting choices made by managers 
whereas non-discretionary accruals depend on the level of activity of the firm (R. 
Chung et al., 2002).  Teoh et al. (1998a&b) dissect discretionary accruals into 
current and non-current components.  They found that discretionary accruals in the 
Modified Jones Model are primarily present in current (e.g. account receivables) 
rather than non-current (e.g. depreciation) items.  Current accruals model is 
more likely to improve the test because systematic earnings management via the 
depreciation is likely to have limited potential (Beneish, 1999).   Therefore, this 
paper focuses on the firm’s current working capital accruals or discretionary current 
accruals.  The discretionary current accruals are utilized as a proxy for earnings 
management.  The paper looks into both directions of earnings management 
which are income-increasing and income-decreasing choices.  To capture these 
two directions, absolute value of discretionary current accruals is being used, as 
suggested by literature (Bartov, 2001).
Current accruals (CA) are the change in non-cash current assets less the change 
in current liabilities.  The change in non-cash current assets and current liabilities 
will be obtained for year 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively.  Total current accruals 
are the sum of both discretionary and non-discretionary accruals.  To identify 
the non-discretionary accruals, the study needs to estimate ordinary least square 
regressions of current accruals on the change in revenue from the previous year.
In this paper, Modified Jones Model parameters are estimated by using the 
ordinary least square regression: 
CA jt / TA j, t-1 = α1 (1/ TA j, t-1) + α2 (ΔREV jt / TA j, t-1) (1)
Where, for industry j in year t: CA jt = current accruals; TA j, t-1= lagged total 
assets; ΔREV jt = change in revenues.
Using the coefficients which are α1 and α2 from the regression in Eq. (1), the 
paper estimates each sample firms’ non-discretionary current accruals (NDCA it). 
Estimation for the non-discretionary current accruals for firm i at time t, NDCAit 
as:
NDCA it = α1 (1/ TA i, t-1) + α2 [(ΔREV it –ΔARit)/TA i, t-1] (2)
Where, for firm i in year t: NDCAit = non-discretionary current accruals; 
TAi, t-1 = lagged total assets; ΔREVit = change in revenues; ΔARit = change in trade 
receivables.
Then estimate the discretionary current accruals (DCAit) as the remaining 
portion from current accruals.  The model is as below:
DCAit = [CA it / TA i, t-1 ] - NDCA it (3)
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Modified Jones Model is estimated using the cross sectional approach.  For 
the cross sectional approach, the coefficient of α1 and α2 of Eq. (1) are industry and 
year specific rather than firm specific by time series method.  The cross sectional 
model and the time series rely on different assumptions.  The cross sectional model 
assumes that the correlation between non-discretionary and accrual determinants 
are determined by industry membership and current economic situation whereas 
the time series model assumes the correlation is determined by firm specific 
characteristics.  Bartov et al. (2001) provide evidence that cross sectional approach 
performs better than time series.  Compared to the time series accruals model, 
the cross sectional model has several advantages: (a) it generates a larger sample 
size to facilitate hypothesis testing; (b) the number of observations per model is 
greater for the cross sectional model, which enhances the efficiency and precision 
of the estimates; (c) the time series model suffers potential survivorship bias as 
it generally requires a minimum of 10 years observations to achieve a reasonable 
level of estimation efficiency (Dechow, et al. 1995); and (d) given the lengthy 
time period required by the time series model, it is possible for the model to be 
misspecified due to non-stationarity.
Measurement of Outside directors and Institutional 
Shareholders
In the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, outside director refers to an 
independent director who does not have close significant family and business 
relationships with management and he or she is not a significant shareholder.  This 
paper defines the outside directors (OUT) as independent non-executive directors 
as reported in the companies’ annual report.  Dummy variable of one is used to 
indicate the board structure which has at least 1/3 of independent directors and zero 
otherwise.  The requirement of at least 1/3 of independent directors in the board 
by the Code as it provides the most effective board balance and no individual or 
small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision.
Ownership structure is measured through the proportion of shares owned by 
institutional shareholders to total outstanding shares.  Institutional shareholders 
who have significant related party transactions with holding company such as 
subsidiary and affiliated companies are excluded.  Organizations with strict 
fiduciary responsibility such as financial institutions, EPF, SOCSO, investment 
trust (including unit trust), insurance and assurance companies, Lembaga Urusan 
Tabung Haji, Permodalan Nasional Berhad and other nominee companies which 
are associated with the above categories of institutions are taken into consideration. 
Information is accessed from the company’s annual report.
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control Variables
Based on prior research, earnings management might be influenced by other 
factors in addition to outside directors and institutional ownership.  For the board’s 
independent monitoring, the paper includes firm size to control for possible negative 
correlation between firm size and discretionary accounting choices (Christie, 1990). 
Book value of total tangible assets is selected as the proxy of firm size.  B. Xie et 
al. (2003) document that firm size is significantly and negatively correlated with 
discretionary current accruals.  This shows that larger firms are less prone to earnings 
management compared to smaller firms.  However, Ronen and Sadan (1981) and 
Moses (1987) found a positive sign between these two variables.  They argued that 
large firms which have huge earnings fluctuations attract public scrutiny.  Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990), argue that large firms have more political cost.  Therefore to 
reduce political attention, managers are more likely to manage the earnings.  Based 
on the above documented evidence, the association between firm size and earnings 
management is inconclusive.
The board size is also considered in this paper as prior research showed that 
larger board size is associated with lower level of discretionary current accruals, 
this is because larger boards might comprise of greater number of experienced 
directors.  However the result is inconclusive.
Board activity is selected as proxy by the number of board meetings.  The study 
only included face to face board meetings as it is the only information available 
in annual report.  Vafeas (1998) documented that written consent of the board 
involve less director action compare to face to face meeting and it is less favorable 
for effective monitoring.
However, for institutional ownership, control variables included size, leverage 
and cash flow from operating activities.  Book value of total assets is being used as 
a proxy for firm size.  A leverage ratio is used to proxy for a firm’s debt covenant 
violation.  Leverage is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
(Cotter, 1998; Whittred and Zimmer, 1986).  Press and Weintrop (1990) suggest 
that managers would favorably manage the earnings when their companies are 
highly leveraged.
In this study, cash flow from operating activities is also used as one of the 
control variables.  Dechow (1994) discovered a negative relationship between cash 
flows and accruals.  It is expected that firms with high level of cash flows are less 
likely to manage the accruals.  The value of cash flows is estimated by dividing the 
cash flows from operating activities to lagged value of total assets.
regression Models for Outside directors
The following regression model is used to test the hypothesis that outside directors 
are effective in constraining earnings fraud:
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ABDCAit = ß0 + ß1 OUTit + ε it (4)
ABDCAit = absolute value of discretionary current accruals of firm i in year t; 
OUT = measurement of board monitoring quality for firm i in year t using the 
composition of outside directors as a proxy.  This variable is measured using 
dummy variable that take the value of one if the outside directors composition is 
1/3 or more than 1/3 of the board size and zero otherwise.  In estimating the model 
in Eq. (4), ß1is expected to be significantly negative.  Control variables of number 
of board meeting (MEET), board size (BSIZE) and the firm size (FSIZE) will be 
inserted into the following model:
ABDCAit = ß0 + ß1 OUTit + ß2 MEETit + ß3 BSIZEit + ß4 FSIZEit + ε it (5)
regression Models for Institutional Shareholders
In general, institutional shareholders are proactive in monitoring firms in which 
they have invested large amount of funds.  Institutional shareholders maintain 
frequent communication with their portfolio firm’s senior management and 
participate in monitoring activities.  Hence the relationship between institutional 
shareholders with earnings management is expected to be negatively correlated. 
The linear regression between institutional ownership and earnings management 
is as follows:
ABDCAit = ß0 + ß1 OWNit + εit (6)
ABDCAit = absolute value of discretionary current accruals of firm i in year t; OWN 
= measurement of institutional ownership monitoring for firm i in year t using the 
percentage of institutional shareholders as a proxy.  In estimating the model in Eq. 
(6), ß1 expects to be significantly negative.  Control variables are included into the 
model to control for any confounding outcomes.  The variables are the firm size 
(FSIZE), leverage level (LEV) and cash flow (CF).  The model for evaluating the 
control variables is as below:
ABDCAit = ß0 + ß1 OWNit + ß2 FSIZEit + ß3 LEVit + ß4 CFit + ε it (7)
regression Model for Board Structure and Institutional 
Ownership Structure
The multilinear regression for the joint influence of board and institutional 
monitoring on the earnings management is as follows:
ABDCAit = ß0 + ß1 OUTit + ß2 MEETit + ß3 BSIZEit + ß4 FSIZEit + ß5 OWNit  
+ ß6 LEVit + ß7 CFit + ß8 (OUTit . OWNit) + ε it
 (8)
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The moderator variable OUTit.OWNit is included in this equation so that the 
interaction effect of board structure and institutional ownership can be captured. 
The level of earnings management activities is expected to be negatively correlated 
with the number of outside directors, institutional ownership and the moderator 
variable OUTit.OWNit.
rESulTS
descriptive Statistic
Table 1 summarizes the specific definition and expected sign for the variables. 
Table 2 provides summary statistic for the variables for total sample which come 
from construction, consumer products and industrial products sectors.  The 
mean and median for absolute discretionary accruals (ABDCA) is 16.2% and 
6.8% respectively.  Three hundred and fifty firms conducted income-increasing 
discretional current accruals (INDCA) whereas two hundred and sixty three firms 
with income-decreasing discretional current accruals (DEDCA).  The results are 
consistent with Beneish (2001) that firms are more likely to manage the earnings 
upward rather than downwards.  The average INDCA for total sample is 15.43% 
whereas DEDCA is -17.23%.  OUT is defined as proportion of outside directors 
in a board with mean and median of 36.83% and 33.33% respectively.  The results 
comply with the requirement made by Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
which require at least one third (33.33%) of independent directors in a board.  The 
mean and median for number of board meet (MEET) is 5 times.  Section 4.44 of the 
Code states that it is difficult to make a company in control if board meets less than 
four times.  Therefore average 5 times of meeting meets the requirement.  Board 
size (BSIZE) for overall sample range from 3 to 17 persons with the mean and 
median of 8 directors in a board.  There is no requirement which strictly determine 
the number of directors in a board.  Firms just have to ensure there are sufficient 
numbers of directors in a board to conduct monitoring jobs.  Log of total assets 
(LogASSET) ranges from 3.338 to 7.366.
The mean (median) of institutional shareholding is 12.35% (8.91%) with a 
range from 0% to 99.45%.  The percentage of institutional shareholding is relatively 
low compared to that documented in developed countries that have more than 25% 
(R. Chung et al., 2002; P.S. Koh, 2003).  Financial leverage ratio (LEV) has a mean 
of 58.18% with the median of 40%.  The ratio is higher than the 33% documented 
by Shireenjit et al. (2003) in a Malaysian study.  The cash flow performance (CF) 
of sampled firms (refer Table 1) has a mean of -49.87% which implies on average, 
net cash used in operating activities is negative.
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Table 1 Variables description and expected direction for earnings management
Variable description and measurement predicted direction
Dependent variable
Earnings management 
(EM)
Discretional (abnormal) current accruals
absolute discretional current accruals (ABDCA)• 
Hypothesis variables
Outside directors (OUT) A dummy variable of 1 if the outside directors • 
consist of at least 1/3 of total board size, 0 
otherwise.
-ve
Institutional shareholders 
(OWN)
Percentage of shares owned by institutional • 
shareholders to total outstanding shares. 
-ve
Control variables
LogASSET Natural log of book value of total tangible assets -ve
BSIZE Board size -ve
MEET Number of board meet -ve
LEV Financial leverage (total liabilities / total assets) +ve
CF Cash flow performance (cash flow from operating 
activities/total lagged assets)
-ve
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the total sample
Variables Mean Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum
ABDCA 
(N=613)
0.1620 0.5338 0.0680 0.0002 9.3925
INDCA 
(N=350)
0.1543 0.5179 0.0783 0.0015 9.3925
DEDCA 
(N=263)
-0.1723 0.5551 -0.0541 -0.0002 -6.2487
OUT 0.3683 0.1013 0.3333 0 0.8750
MEET 5.30 2.514 5 0 33
BSIZE 7.97 2.071 8 3 17
LogASSET 5.5711 0.5493 5.4880 3.338 7.366
OWN 0.1235 0.1288 0.0891 0 0.9945
LEV 0.5818 1.4378 0.4000 0.0046 24.8678
CF -0.4987 9.9852 0.0575 -209.0105 1.0647
OUT is Proportion of outside directors; ABDCA is the absolute discretionary current accruals; INDCA is the 
income-increasing discretionary current accruals and DEDCA is income-decreasing discretionary current accruals.
342
International Journal of Economics and Management
correlation Analysis
The correlation analysis helps to ascertain whether there is any multicollinearity 
problem among the independent variables.  Based on standard criteria, the 
correlation value of less than 0.7 would not pose any serious multicollinearity 
problems and affect the validity of the findings.  Table 3 shows that none of the 
correlation value exceeds 0.7.  Hence there was no serious multicollinearity problem 
among the independent variables.
Table 3 Pearson correlation for independent variables
ABdcA OuT MEET BSIZE logASSET Own lEV cF OuTOwn
ABDCA 1
OUT -0.042 1
MEET 0.031 0.004 1
BSIZE -0.077 -0.198** -0.103* 1
LogASSET -0.116** -0.112** -0.019 0.331** 1
OWN -0.041 -0.140** 0.043 0.280** 0.245** 1
LEV 0.337** -0.066 0.344** -0.201** -0.236** 0.086* 1
CF -0.169** 0.032 -0.039 0.109** 0.216** 0.052 -0.367** 1
OUTOWN -0.041 0.437** -0.006 0.052 0.096* 0.631** -0.082* 0.041 1
Note: Table 1 for variable definitions; * significant at 0.05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level; based on a two-tailed test
regression results for Board Structure
Table 4 provides the univariate ordinary least square regression results with 
absolute discretionary current accruals (ABDCA) as the dependent variable and 
outside directors (OUT) as the independent variable.  Overall, OUT has a negative 
sign which is in line with expectation but not statistically significant.  This implies 
that proportion of outside directors has no relationship with the level of earnings 
management.  On sectorial basis, construction sector reports a weak negative 
relationship which is only significant at the 0.1 level.
Table 5 shows the multiple regression results for board structure.  Overall, 
the estimated coefficient for OUT is negative and consistent with the expected 
sign but has weak evidence at 0.1 level with the t-value of -1.561.  Among the 
control variables, only the firm size (LogASSET) portrays strong evidence which 
is significant at 0.001 level with the negative expected sign.  This is consistent with 
the notion that larger firms are more scrutinized than smaller firms and hence has 
less incidence of earnings management.
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Table 4 Board of director univariate regression results
ABdcAit = ß0 + ß1 OuTit + ε it  
regressions constant OuT r2 F durbin watson
All 0.202 -5.26-02 0.002 1.071 2.012
(N=613) (4.548)^ (-1.035)
Construction 0.177 -5.36-02 0.142 2.131* 2.258
(N=106) (5.723)^ (-1.460)*
Consumer Products 9.100-02 -1.23-02 0.002 0.327 1.747
(N=171) (4.728)^ (-0.572)
Industrial Products 0.260 -6.50-02 0.002 0.511 2.032
(N=336) (3.272)^ (-0.715)
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent t-values
Variables are defined as follow:
ABDCA = Absolute discretionary current accruals
OUT = Dummy variable equal to one if proportion of outside directors are equal or more than 1/3 of total board 
size
* significant at 0.1
** significant at 0.05
*** significant at 0.01
^ significant at 0.001
On sectorial basis, OUT is only significant in the construction sector at 0.05 
level with the expected negative sign.  It supports the hypothesis that the presence 
of outside directors is able to reduce the likelihood of manager to manage earnings. 
Apart from that, control variable for number of board meetings (MEET) is also 
highly significant (t=3.345) in the construction sector at 0.001 level.  However the 
positive sign of MEET is inconsistent with the expected sign.  The evidence found 
that some of the firms which have high frequency of board meetings are due to their 
on-going restructuring scheme.  Another possible evidence is that board meeting 
might be attended by most of the inside directors rather than outside directors.
Coefficient of LogASSET in consumer products and industrial products 
sectors show the expected negative sign.  The LogASSET is highly significant at 
0.01 level with the t-value of -2.725 in consumer products sector and -2.514 in 
industrial products sector.  It supports the notion that large firms are subjected to 
more scrutiny and able to reduce earnings management practice.
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regression results for Institutional Ownership Structure
The results for the univariate regression for the institutional ownership variable 
are shown in Table 6.  Overall, the institutional ownership variable (OWN) has 
negative relationship with earnings management but not statistically significant at 
0.05 level.  On sectorial basis, OWN variable only provides weak evidence in the 
construction sector with the expected sign of negative at 0.1 level.
Table 7 reports the multiple regression results for institutional ownership. 
Using the full sample of 613 firms, institutional ownership (OWN) has expected 
negative sign, however the result is not statistically significant (t=-0.104) at 0.05 
level.  The findings indicate that in contrast to the evidence in developed markets, 
institutional shareholders in Malaysian firms are not an effective mechanism to 
constrain the earnings management.  However, financial leverage (LEV) coefficient 
is highly significant (t=7.508) with the expected positive sign to ABDCA.  This 
evidence is consistent with previous research on discretionary accruals choices 
(Dechow et al. 1995; DeFond and Park, 1997; Becker et al., 1998) which expect 
that managers of the firms are more likely to adopt aggressive earnings management 
when the firms approach their accounting-based debt covenant.
On sectorial basis, construction sector has a negative and significant (0.05 
level) coefficient for the OWN variable.  It supports the hypothesis that substantial 
institutional shareholding is able to mitigate the incidence of earnings management. 
The control variable of LogASSET in construction sector is marginally significant 
at 0.1 level with a positive sign, inconsistent with the expectation.  However in the 
consumer products sector, LogASSET has a negative expected sign and statistically 
significant at the level of 0.05.  Besides that, industrial products sector has a 
significant expected negative sign in LEV coefficient at 0.001 level.
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Table 6 Institutional ownership univariate regression results
ABdcAit = ß0 + ß1 Ownit + ε it
regressions constant Own r2 F durbin watson
All 0.183 -0.170 0.002 1.032 2.014
(N=613) (6.125)^ (-1.016)
Construction 0.168 -0.242 0.032 3.413* 2.057
(N=106) (7.375)^ (-1.847)*
Consumer Products 8.106-02 6.419-04 0.000 0.000 1.741
(N=171) (6.773)^ (0.010)
Industrial Products 0.237 -0.218 0.001 0.489 2.033
(N=336) (4.409)^ (-0.699)
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent t-values
Variables are defined as follow:
ABDCA = Absolute discretionary current accruals
OWN = Percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding shares
* significant at 0.1
** significant at 0.05
*** significant at 0.01
^ significant at 0.001
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regression results for Board Structure and Institutional 
Ownership Structure
Table 8 shows the multiple regression results for the joint effect of board and 
institutional monitoring on earnings management.  In the overall sample, all the 
explanatory variables show the expected signs.  Although OUT and OWN variables 
have expected negative sign, the results are not significant at the 0.05 level. 
Therefore for the sample analyzed, outside directors and institutional shareholders 
have no relationship with the practice of earnings management.  Some possible 
explanations for this result are that outside directors and institutional shareholders 
might lack the financial sophistication to detect earnings management.  Further, 
both parties may be a passive group in monitoring the firms.  Also the presence of a 
large number of managerial shareholders may make it difficult for outside directors 
and institutional shareholders to effectively curb the earnings management. 
Control variable for financial leverage (LEV) has expected positive sign 
and statistically significant at 0.001 level.  The finding supports the notion that 
managers exercise the earnings management when the firms are closer to default 
on debt covenants (Press and Weintrop, 1990).  Board meetings (MEET) also show 
expected negative sign which is significant at 0.05 level.  The result is consistent with 
that reported by Vafeas (1998) which indicates that when boards meet more often 
they able to improve financial performance and reduce the incidence of earnings 
management.  It gives an idea that an active board may be a better monitoring 
mechanism than an inactive board.  Overall, all the independent variables are able 
to explain 12.5% of the variation in the mean of ABDCA.
From the regressions across the sectors, construction sector provides weak 
evidence in OUT variable with the expected sign of negative at 0.1 level.  LEV 
has a negative sign which is not in line with expectation and marginally significant 
at 0.1 level.  MEET variable having a positive sign which is also not in line to 
the expected sign, however the result is highly significant at 0.001 level.  This is 
because some of the firms are undergoing a restructuring scheme, therefore the 
number of board meetings are more frequent.
For the consumer products sector, firm size (LogASSET) has a huge impact 
on earnings management.  LogASSET variable portrays a negative expected sign 
which is significant at 0.01 level.  However, MEET variable has a positive sign 
which is not consistent with expectation and is significant at 10 percent level.
In the industrial products sector, MEET variable achieves the expected negative 
sign and is statistically significant at 0.001 level.  In addition, LEV also shows a 
significant (0.001 level) positive sign.
In conclusion, the monitoring role of outside directors and institutional 
shareholders in constraining the level of earnings management in Malaysian firms 
seem to be not as effective as that documented in developed countries.  Nevertheless, 
the outside directors monitoring role still have some impact in reducing the earnings 
management practice in the construction sector.
349
The Effect of Board Structure and Institutional Ownership Structure on Earnings Management
Ta
bl
e 
8 
B
oa
rd
 a
nd
 In
st
itu
tio
na
l O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
St
ru
ct
ur
e 
M
ul
tip
le
 R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
A
B
d
c
A
it =
 ß
0 +
 ß
1 O
u
T i
t +
 ß
2 
M
E
E
T i
t +
 ß
3 B
SI
Z
E
it +
 ß
4 F
SI
Z
E
it 
+ 
ß 5
 O
w
n
it +
ß 6
 l
E
V
it +
 ß
7 c
F i
t +
 ß
8 
(O
u
T i
t .
 O
w
n
it)
 +
 ε
 it
r
eg
re
ss
io
n
c
on
st
an
t
O
u
T
M
E
E
T
B
SI
Z
E
l
og
A
SS
E
T
O
w
n
l
E
V
c
F
O
u
TO
w
n
r
2
F
d
ur
bi
n 
w
at
so
n
A
ll
0.
38
4
-3
.5
0-
02
-1
.9
1-
02
-1
.9
2-
03
-2
.7
7-
02
-1
.7
5-
02
0.
12
8
-2
.1
4-
03
2.
88
8-
02
0.
12
5
10
.7
83
^
1.
99
4
(N
=6
13
)
(1
.6
45
)*
(-
0.
52
1)
(-
2.
18
7)
**
(-
0.
17
6)
(-
0.
67
6)
(-
0.
06
6)
(7
.6
03
)^
(-
0.
96
0)
(0
.0
88
)
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
3.
33
5-
02
-7
.9
8-
02
1.
91
4-
02
-6
.0
0-
03
2.
50
3-
02
-0
.2
16
-5
.3
1-
02
7.
90
3-
02
3.
16
9-
02
0.
19
0
2.
84
2*
**
2.
64
4
(N
=1
06
)
(0
.1
77
)
(-
1.
59
0)
*
(3
.6
38
)^
(-
0.
59
1)
(0
.7
05
)
(-
0.
66
2)
(-
1.
82
3)
*
(0
.3
85
)
(0
.0
94
)
C
on
su
m
er
 p
ro
du
ct
s
0.
23
3
-4
.1
7-
02
1.
07
3-
02
6.
93
3-
03
-4
.4
4-
02
-0
.1
21
4.
34
8-
02
-7
.5
9-
03
0.
15
5
0.
07
8
1.
70
9*
1.
79
8
(N
=1
71
)
(2
.3
78
)*
*
(-
1.
36
8)
(1
.8
51
)*
(1
.4
35
)
(-
2.
57
7)
**
*
(-
1.
06
4)
(1
.3
17
)
(-
0.
36
7)
(1
.1
32
)
In
du
st
ria
l p
ro
du
ct
s
0.
74
3
-9
.4
9-
03
-5
.4
2-
02
-1
.3
6-
02
-4
.6
1-
02
0.
21
0
0.
15
1
-6
.9
7-
04
-6
.9
5-
02
0.
15
1
7.
26
7^
2.
01
2
(N
=3
36
)
(1
.6
78
)*
(-
0.
07
9)
(-
3.
23
7)
^
(-
0.
71
9)
(-
0.
61
0)
(0
.4
69
)
(6
.2
62
)^
(-
0.
23
4)
(-
0.
11
5)
N
ot
e:
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 re
pr
es
en
t t
-v
al
ue
s
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 d
efi
ne
d 
as
 f
ol
lo
w
:
A
B
D
C
A
 =
 A
bs
ol
ut
e 
D
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
 C
ur
re
nt
 A
cc
ru
al
s
O
U
T 
= 
D
um
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
eq
ua
l t
o 
on
e 
if 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 o
ut
si
de
 d
ire
ct
or
s a
re
 e
qu
al
 o
r m
or
e 
th
an
 1
/3
 o
f t
ot
al
 b
oa
rd
 si
ze
M
EE
T 
= 
N
um
be
r o
f b
oa
rd
 m
ee
t
B
SI
ZE
 =
 B
oa
rd
 si
ze
Lo
gA
SS
ET
 =
 F
irm
 si
ze
 m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 lo
g 
of
 b
oo
k 
va
lu
e 
of
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
s
O
W
N
 =
 P
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f s
ha
re
s o
w
ne
d 
by
 in
st
itu
tio
na
l s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s t
o 
to
ta
l o
ut
st
an
di
ng
 sh
ar
es
L
E
V
 =
 fi
na
nc
ia
l l
ev
er
ag
e
C
F
 =
 c
as
h 
fl
ow
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 0
.1
**
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 a
t 0
.0
5
**
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 0
.0
1
^ 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 0
.0
01
350
International Journal of Economics and Management
cOncluSIOnS
Overall, this study finds no evidence between the degree of earnings management 
with the proportion of outside directors and institutional shareholders in the 
industrial products and consumer products sectors.  However, the findings provide 
weak evidence that outside directors can constrain the earnings management in 
the construction sector.  This might be because construction sector is one of the 
sectors which has been badly affected by the economy downturn which resulted in 
significant non-performing loans.  Hence this sector has been closely scrutinized 
by the authorities and shareholders.
There are a few possible explanations for the inefficient monitoring by outside 
directors and institutional shareholders in curbing the earnings management in 
Malaysia.  Outside directors may lack the financial expertise required to detect the 
earnings management, therefore they would find it difficult to assess or analyse 
certain information.  It means the board’s effectiveness at monitoring the financial 
reporting process depends on the ability of outside directors to understand earnings 
management methods.  In addition, outside directors in Malaysia may not be fully 
independent in the board.  The outside directors may be close friends of the non-
independent directors or the people in the board.  Also the presence of dominant 
managerial shareholders may make it difficult for outside directors and institutional 
shareholders to effectively constrain the earnings management practices. 
Furthermore, passive or complacent attitude of outside directors and institutional 
shareholders may also lead to ineffective monitoring process in a firm.
The study observed that adding more outside directors and institutional 
shareholders in a firm may not improve the governance practices especially in 
firms with highly concentrated equity ownership.  Apart from that, the process to 
select outside directors is not clearly stated and transparent, thus making it difficult 
to enforce good corporate governance practices.
Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended that the relevant 
authorities should focus on the equity ownership and the process of appointing 
external directors.  This is especially relevant during economic downturns when 
firms may not performing and thus resort to manage their earnings to portray a 
better picture so as to maintain their share prices and their job security.
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